Serf έγραψε:Σε επίπεδο σοβαρής ανάλυσης:
( https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr ... t-april-14 )The loss of the Moskva will reduce Russia’s ability to conduct cruise missile strikes but is unlikely to deal a decisive blow to Russian operations on the whole. The Moskva’s main role was likely conducting precision strikes with Kalibr cruise missiles on targets in Ukrainian rear areas, including logistics centers and airfields. These Russian strikes have been effective but limited in number compared to airstrikes and ground-launched cruise missiles throughout the invasion, and the loss of the Moskva is unlikely to be a decisive blow. Ukraine's possibly demonstrated ability to target Russian warships in the Black Sea may change Russian operating patterns, however, forcing them to either deploy additional air and point-defense assets to the Black Sea battlegroup or withdraw vessels from positions near the Ukrainian coast.
) και ενα βάψιμο αντισκωριακό αστάρι (ενα χέρι) πρέπει να κεραστούν τσάι με πολώνιο 
MONMAN έγραψε:Δεύτερον και εξίσου σημαντικό οι υπεύθυνοι που φάγαν τα ρούβλια δήθεν κάνοντας ανακαίνιση /εκσυγχρονισμό αλλα στην ουσία μια ανακατασκευή στους κινητήρες (σε euro 3 να μην καπνίζουν πολύ
The Neptune missiles were to be delivered to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in April 2022.
According to many experts and analysts, the delivery schedule was interrupted due to the war, and Ukraine doesn’t have an anti-ship missile capability in its arsenal.
Another claim made by the Ukrainian media was that TB2 Bayraktar drones were used to distract the Russian cruiser and launch the anti-ship missiles at Moskva when it was busy pursuing the Turkish-made UAV. This claim seems unrealistic, as the Moskva had the capabilities to deal with multiple threats.
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