
Δεν περίμενα κάτι άλλο βέβαια από τον άνθρωπο που (δεν) έγραψε αυτό το βιβλίο:
Peugeot 206 1.6 110ps
Citroen C4 Picasso 1,8
MWB 320i Ε90
Now:
Audi A3 1,6 FSI =>



: προφανώς η Μοσάντ έμαθε ότι οι μουλάδες είχαν στις 28/2 κάποια υψηλού επιπέδου συνάντηση (σωστό, έφαγαν κάμποσους μαζί εκτός από τον Χαμενεϊ) και άρα είχαν ένα παράθυρο ευκαιρίας για decapitation strike (όπως αυτό που έκαναν στη Χεζμπολάχ πέρυσι). Μέχρι εκεί καλά, αλλά θεώρησαν ότι μετά από αυτό θα ξεσηκωθεί ο λαός και θα διώξει τους μουλάδες
ξεχνώντας το κλασσικό Rally 'round the flag (ιδίως σε ένα λαό με τόση ιστορία όπως οι Πέρσες, δεν είναι τίποτα καμηλιέρηδες) και υποτίμησαν ποιός κάνει πραγματικά κουμάντο στο Ιράν (οι Φρουροί της Επανάστασης, όχι ένα συγκεκριμένο πρόσωπο... εξάλλου και τώρα ο γιός Χαμενεϊ πιθανότατα είναι νεκρός ή σε κώμα.. figurehead είναι...). Με αποτέλεσμα μια τρύπα στο νερό

Israeli triple-tap strike kills three paramedics in Lebanon, officials say
A team from the Islamic Health Association was attacked as it tried to rescue people from the site of an Israeli attack in the town of Mayfadoun, in the Nabatieh region on Wednesday, according to the Lebanese health ministry. One paramedic was killed and a second remains missing.
When a second team from the Islamic Health Association headed to the site, it too was attacked, and three paramedics were wounded, the ministry said. Then, two ambulances of the Risala Scout Association and the Nabatieh Ambulance Service, which had been deployed to the site, were also attacked. Two paramedics were killed and three others wounded.
Earlier this month, the BBC spent several days with Serhan's team in Nabatieh, which has been repeatedly targeted by the Israeli military during the past six weeks of war with Hezbollah
More than 2,100 people have been killed and 7,000 others wounded since the start of the war in Lebanon on 2 March, according to the country's health ministry, which does not distinguish between combatants and civilians. The number includes at least 260 women and 172 children.


Towns and villages in southern Lebanon are being levelled by Israeli demolitions, satellite images and videos obtained by BBC Verify reveal.
BBC Verify analysis found more than 1,400 buildings had been destroyed since 2 March based on verified visual evidence.
This is just a snapshot of the overall damage caused by Israeli air strikes and demolitions, because of limited access on the ground and available satellite imagery. The true scale is likely to be much higher.

Vladimir Putin’s ambitions are dying in Africa. As jihadists swept through Mali late last month, they also swept aside the assurances that Moscow had dangled to governments in the Sahel for years. That collapse threatens the region but also offers Washington an opportunity to reassert the control it had foolishly relinquished.
The scale of the terror offensive came into sharp view in a single weekend as the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) — al-Qaeda’s Sahel affiliate — and nomadic Tuareg rebels seized towns and military installations across the country. On April 25 a JNIM suicide car bomber killed Defense Minister Gen. Sadio Camara at his residence in Kati. Abu Hudhayfa al-Bambari, a local jihadist commander, said that the “entire city” of Bamako, the capital, “is under lockdown.”
The Africa Corps, a group of Russian mercenaries that has operated in Mali since 2021, replied by partially retreating. Its abandonment of Kidal, a mineral-rich city in the north, marked the beginning of the end of Moscow’s influence on the continent.
That was perhaps a predictable conclusion of Russian overreach. As NATO concentrated on its eastern flank in the early 2020s, the Kremlin built a parallel pressure system along Europe’s southern perimeter, running from Libya through Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. By August 2024, close to 2,000 Russian personnel operated across Libyan military sites; Sudan had offered Moscow a 25-year Red Sea naval base; and the juntas of the Sahel’s three coup states had cast Russia as their sole security guarantor.
Moscow presented this as liberation from Western dominance, while creating a corridor for migration and weapons transfers to put even more pressure on NATO’s southern flank. By granting Niger’s junta the political cover to sever ties with the West, Moscow also cleared the path for a $56 million deal in which Tehran acquired 300 tons of yellowcake uranium from Niamey in exchange for drones and missiles.
The Kremlin’s Sahel proposition rested on three pillars: regime protection, territorial control and military competence. At last May’s Africa Day, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov delivered a message from Putin pledging to “broaden the scope of Russia-Africa relations, ... contributing to the emergence of a just and democratic multipolar world order.”
The reality on the ground moved in the opposite direction. The Africa Corps concentrated its resources around Bamako and gold-extraction corridors, leaving vast interior territories to the JNIM. The Tuareg, whose demands for autonomy Bamako had long rejected, found in the JNIM a more reliable partner. Since the July 2024 ambush that killed several Russian mercenaries, that convergence eliminated the maneuvering room between factions that Moscow needed to hold the country together.
The deeper irony is that Russia engineered these conditions. The Africa Corps ran a series of anti-French disinformation campaigns in Mali — the most notorious of which was a staged mass grave that it attributed to the departing French at the Gossi base in April 2022. Russian Houses, cultural and educational centers backed by Moscow, cultivated Pan-Africanist networks that amplified anti-French sentiment across Sahelian public life. The campaign succeeded in expelling France but also removed the only power capable of sustaining large-scale counterinsurgency operations. For all its interest in resources and prestige, Moscow never matched Paris’s commitment or capacity on the ground. The JNIM thus inherited the territory and imposed a blockade on Bamako that firepower alone couldn’t lift.
The stakes transcend Mali. Burkina Faso and Niger have also tied themselves to Putin’s benevolence as members of the Kremlin-backed Alliance of Sahel States. A jihadi-controlled Sahel would sit astride the main overland migration corridors from sub-Saharan Africa to the Mediterranean, giving al-Qaeda its largest sanctuary since Afghanistan. The 2015 migration crisis, which still sows discord among Europeans, originated from a single collapsing state. Bamako’s implosion threatens to drag its bloc down with it
That is, unless the United States takes advantage of at least three opportunities to recover its standing with Mali.
The first is diplomatic. Washington lacks the accumulated resentments of Françafrique — the post-independence framework that enabled France to maintain ties to its former colonies. The disinformation machinery Moscow deployed against Paris has less purchase against a power without that colonial history. U.S. security and diplomatic channels with Mali’s military government are already reopening, with talks advancing toward the resumption of drone and intelligence flights. Washington should keep every such channel open. The Russian-aligned juntas are confronting a jihadist threat that Moscow has failed to suppress. By offering pragmatic security cooperation without heavy political preconditions, the U.S. can help protect vulnerable populations.
The second is economic. Project Vault, the U.S. initiative announced in February to build a strategic private-sector-led critical-minerals reserve, gives Washington a concrete framework to anchor reengagement on terms that Bamako can’t afford to refuse. Mali is one of Africa’s largest producers of lithium — an asset the junta needs to monetize. The U.S. project thus offers a commercially driven path without the political conditions Mali has rejected in the past. Resource revenue also funds the security apparatus the junta needs to survive, giving Washington leverage it currently lacks.
The third and most strategically consequential opportunity is deepening the U.S.-Morocco partnership. At the 13th African Land Forces summit in Rome in March, Gen. Christopher Donahue announced the establishment of a drone training center on Moroccan soil. Washington and Rabat signed a 10-year defense road map weeks later. In this sense, Morocco offers what no other transatlantic partner can: an ally with direct counterterrorism reach into the Sahel and decades of institutional knowledge. Delegating regional security to a capable partner would free American resources for the Indo-Pacific, the theater Beijing has worked hardest to keep Washington from focusing on.
African governments have seen what Russian reliability looks like. Moscow abandoned Syria’s Bashar al-Assad the moment rebel forces reached Damascus in December 2024, accepting his exile over any serious effort to sustain him. It is now doing the same in Mali. No government on the continent weighing its options can miss the pattern. The U.S. should seek to make that reversal permanent — knowing, as ever, that a Sahel in free fall won’t be contained.
Chinese Hegemony Might Be Happening
There were always reasons to doubt it was a real possibility—until now.
«Από το 2025 και μετά, ο Τραμπ έκανε σχεδόν όλα όσα θα έκανε κάποιος αν επιδίωκε συνειδητά να εκτοπίσει η Κίνα τις ΗΠΑ και να αποκτήσει κυρίαρχη θέση στην άμεση περιφέρειά της» αναφέρει.
Ο Τραμπ κάνει ό,τι μπορεί ώστε αυτό το μέλλον να ανήκει στην Κίνα, όχι στις ΗΠΑ
Σε μια εποχή όπου η επιστημονική υπεροχή αποτελεί το κλειδί για την οικονομική παραγωγικότητα και τη στρατιωτική ισχύ, ο Τραμπ μείωσε τη χρηματοδότηση του National Science Foundation, εκκαθάρισε το συμβουλευτικό του συμβούλιο, απέλυσε έμπειρους επιστήμονες σε δεκάδες κυβερνητικές υπηρεσίες.
«Πρόκειται για πράξη μονομερούς αφοπλισμού, τη στιγμή που η Κίνα κάνει ακριβώς το αντίθετο» σημειώνει ο Γουόλτ, τονίζοντας πως έτσι ο Τραμπ «παραχώρησε στην Κίνα τα ηγετικά πλεονεκτήματα στις αναδυόμενες πράσινες τεχνολογίες -ηλιακή και αιολική ενέργεια, προηγμένες μπαταρίες, ηλεκτρικά οχήματα κ.λπ.- ενώ διπλασίασε την επένδυση σε τεχνολογίες του 20ού αιώνα: τα ορυκτά καύσιμα και τον κινητήρα εσωτερικής καύσης».
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China is Russia's largest trading partner, while Russia makes up just 4% of China's international trade. China exports more than any other country to Russia, and its economy is significantly larger than Russia's.
A recent Bloomberg report found that Russia was importing more than 90% of its sanctioned technology from China, a 10% increase on the previous year.
Moscow has few viable alternatives to Beijing, a buyer that offers a scale of demand and market integral to Russia's survival.


markvag έγραψε:Οπότε, έχουμε τις δύο μέχρι πρότινος υπερδυνάμεις, στην πράξη να υποκλίνονται στο νέο αφεντικό.
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