- 05 Μάιος 2026, 09:20
#904146
Να και μία πρόσφατη ανάλυση, φαίνεται αρκετά σοβαρή και τεκμηριωμένη:
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-grinding-war-ukraineAccording to CSIS estimates, Russian forces suffered nearly 1.2 million battlefield casualties, which include killed, wounded, and missing, between February 2022 and December 2025, as highlighted in Figure 2.15 There were roughly 415,000 Russian casualties in 2025 alone, with an average of nearly 35,000 casualties per month. In addition, there were roughly 275,000 to 325,000 Russian battlefield fatalities between February 2022 and December 2025
...
No major power has suffered anywhere near these numbers of casualties or fatalities in any war since World War II
...
Russian battlefield fatalities in Ukraine are more than 17 times greater than Soviet fatalities in Afghanistan during the 1980s, 11 times greater than during Russia’s First and Second Chechen Wars in the 1990s and 2000s, respectively, and over five times greater than all Russian and Soviet wars combined since World War II
...
Russian battlefield casualties and fatalities are significantly greater than Ukrainian casualties and fatalities—with a ratio of roughly 2.5:1 or 2:1. Ukrainian forces likely suffered somewhere between 500,000 and 600,000 casualties, including killed, wounded, and missing, and between 100,000 and 140,000 fatalities between February 2022 and December 2025. Combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties may be as high as 1.8 million and could reach 2 million total casualties by the spring of 2026
2 εκατομμύρια απώλειες
Στην Ευρώπη, που έχει περάσει 2 ΠΠ
Ολοι λένε (και ορθά) τι καταστροφή είναι για τον οποιοδήποτε δυτικό ηγέτη να αρχίσουν να έρχονται πίσω φέρετρα στρατιωτών της χώρας.
Δεν συμβαίνει το ίδιο με τον Πούτιν ? Μάλλον όχι και υποθέτω για συνδυασμό 2 λόγων:
- Παραδοσιακά από την εποχή των Τσάρων οι Ρώσοι ηγέτες δεν είχαν μεγάλο σεβασμό για τις ανθρώπινες απώλειες, δεν δίσταζαν να "ρίξουν κορμιά στην κρεατομηχανή" και ο λαός τους το αποδέχεται αυτό
- Επειδή η Ρωσία δεν είναι αυτό ακριβώς που θα λέγαμε δημοκρατική χώρα και η ελευθερία των ΜΜΕ δεν είναι μεγάλη
δεν γίνονται και τόσο γνωστές οι απώλειες. Πόσο δε μάλλον που πολλοί από τα θύματα προέρχονται από απομονωμένες περιοχές (κάπου διάβαζα ότι στη Ρωσία αν είσαι νέος από τη Μόσχα ή την Πετρούπολη και δεν θέλεις να πας στον πόλεμο της Ουκρανίας, απλά το λες. Ενώ στη Σιβηρία δεν έχεις επιλογή. Το λέει και παρακάτω στο Link αυτό)
Αν και:
Some data suggests that there has been a major decline in popular support inside Russia for the war. According to one poll, for example, 57 percent of Russians in May 2023 believed that most people in their inner social circle supported the war, compared to 39 percent who opposed the war. By October 2025, those numbers flipped, with 55 percent of Russians who believed that most people in their inner social circle opposed the war, compared to 45 who supported the war.
Φυσικά και οι Ουκρανοί έχουν μεγάλες απώλειες. Αλλά σε αυτούς το (απ΄ ό,τι φαίνεται επιτυχές) αφήγημα είναι ότι υπερασπίζονται την πατρίδα τους και κάνουν έναν αμυντικό πόλεμο.
Why are Russian casualties and fatalities so high? There are several possible explanations, such as Russia’s failure to effectively conduct combined arms and joint warfare, poor tactics and training, corruption, low morale, and Ukraine’s effective defense-in-depth strategy in a war that favors the defense.
Russia’s attrition strategy has accepted the costs of high casualties in hopes of eventually wearing down Ukraine’s military and society. On the battlefield, Russia has utilized dismounted infantry to wear down and attrit Ukrainian lines, along with small first-person view (FPV) drones, artillery, glide bombs, and other stand-off weapons. Russian units have routinely conducted advances using small squads of troops, often poorly trained, that are supported by armored vehicles or light mobility vehicles. Higher Russian headquarters frequently order these forces to advance toward Ukrainian positions to conduct reconnaissance by drawing fire. If Ukrainian positions are positively identified, Russian soldiers may be sent forward to attack positions, which are further mapped and then targeted with artillery, FPV drones, and glide bombs. These tactics have led to high fatalities and casualties.
Ukrainian forces have also imposed significant costs with their defense-in-depth strategy in a war that has largely favored the defender. Ukraine has used trenches, dragon’s teeth (anti-tank obstacles), mines, and other barriers—along with artillery and drones—to attrit advancing Russian soldiers and vehicles. The eastern front line, for instance, continues to be saturated with drones. As a result, vehicle movement is difficult within 15 kilometers of the front line. Infantry soldiers must instead march to their positions for 10 to 15 kilometers. Ukraine has also relied on decoys and deception and is building frontline headquarters underground. These actions have affected Russia’s rate of advance.
Με άλλα λόγια, μετά τις επιτυχίες τους το 2022 οι Ρώσοι έχουν εγκλωβιστεί σε έναν πόλεμο που ευννοεί τους Ουκρανούς, οι οποίοι κάνουν ό,τι πρέπει να κάνουν στην περίπτωση αυτή (ναι σωστά, οι στρατηγοί τους αποφοίτησαν από τη Σοβιετική ΣΣΕ προ 35-40 ετών
)
Russia’s slow rate of advance in multiple offensives over the last two years underscores the attritional nature of the war in Ukraine and the difficulty of breaking through fortified defensive positions. This analysis measures the straight-line distance that the front line has shifted during specific military offensives.
After Russia won control of the city of Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast in February 2024, Russian forces began a sustained offensive aimed at the nearby city of Pokrovsk, a key logistics and transportation hub that supported Ukrainian operations across the eastern front line. The offensive relied on infantry assaults, heavy artillery shelling, drone attacks, and glide bomb strikes to erode Ukrainian positions. From late February 2024 to early January 2026, Russian forces advanced just under 50 kilometers, at an average pace of only about 70 meters per day. By January 2026, Russia controlled most of the city of Pokrovsk
Μα εδώ διαβάζαμε (παλαιότερα, τώρα τελευταία όχι και τόσο
) για "προέλαση της Ρωσίας" και "πέφτει το ΧΧΧ" και τελικά μιλάμε για 70 μέτρα την ημέρα...
In all of its offensives over the last two years, Russia has failed to generate rapid breakthroughs to collapse the Ukrainian front line and allow for sweeping territorial gains. Figure 3 illustrates this trend by comparing the average rates of advance for major offensives in Ukraine since 2022 alongside historical benchmarks from World War I, World War II, and other wars. Russia’s Pokrovsk offensive has advanced slower than Allied forces in the Battle of the Somme in World War I, one of the most grinding offensives of the war. Russia’s offensives around Kupiansk and Chasiv Yar have been even less efficient, moving at mere fractions of the pace of historical campaigns
In addition to its slow rate of advance, Russia’s territorial gains over the past two years have been modest. In 2024, Russian forces seized approximately 3,604 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory, or about 0.6 percent of Ukraine—an area smaller than the U.S. state of Delaware. In 2025, Russian forces made marginally larger gains, seizing approximately 4,831 square kilometers (about 0.8 percent of Ukraine) and retaking approximately 473 square kilometers in Russia’s Kursk Oblast.
Russia’s gains since it took the initiative in January 2024 are far smaller than the large territorial shifts seen earlier in the war. At the peak of the initial invasion in March 2022, Russian forces seized roughly 115,000 square kilometers in less than five weeks, but by April 2022, Ukraine had retaken more than 35,000 square kilometers. By November 2022, Ukraine had retaken approximately 75,000 square kilometers, including through successful counteroffensives around Kharkiv and Kherson
Δεν τα "ξαναπήραν" οι Ουκρανοί τα εδάφη αυτά, οι Ρώσοι έκαναν "στρατηγική αναδίπλωση"
In total, Russian forces have seized around 75,000 square kilometers (approximately 12 percent of Ukraine) since the 2022 invasion and control about 120,000 square kilometers (approximately 20 percent of Ukraine and an area roughly the size of Pennsylvania), including territory seized before 2022 such as Crimea and parts of Donbas.
Βέβαια τσάκα-τσάκα έγιναν "δημοψηφίσματα"
και οι περιοχές αυτές (καθώς και όσα μέρη τους δεν έχουν ακόμα καταληφθεί
) ενσωματώθηκαν στη Ρωσική Ομοσπονδία. Είναι που ο Πούτιν το 2022 είχε πει: "δεν ενδιαφερόμαστε να καταλάβουμε Ουκρανικό έδαφος"
The Russian economy has held up better than some expected following Western economic sanctions, which the United States and other Western countries imposed after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Russia’s trade balance remains in surplus, the ruble is not far off its prewar valuation against the dollar, and the country heavily relies on such energy exports as oil. But Russia’s economy is showing signs of strain, and long-term productivity looks bleak.
In 2025, Russian manufacturing declined at its fastest rate since March 2022, with contractions in output and new orders, a rising labor shortage, and a decrease in input buying. Overall, Russian manufacturing suffered seven consecutive months of contraction in 2025, with production levels declining for ten consecutive months. In addition, consumer demand weakened and inflation was high. The country also faced a labor crunch. Oil revenues lagged with lower global prices, which contributed to a fiscal squeeze and a widening budget deficit. Economic growth slowed to 0.6 percent in 2025, and the International Monetary Fund estimated that growth would remain slow, at 0.8 percent, in 2026.
Russia also faces a capital problem. The country receives limited foreign investment and is unable to borrow on international markets. To finance the Ukraine war, the Kremlin has borrowed at home and raised taxes. It spends roughly half its budget on the armed forces, the military-industrial complex, domestic security, and debt service. While the war sustains jobs and industrial activity, it produces few lasting assets or productivity gains. Higher taxes burden the civilian economy, which is already suffering from double-digit interest rates and significant labor shortages. Tank factories are working overtime, but automobile producers have cut shifts
Economic output is directed toward low-productivity goods necessary to sustain the war effort. While such items as ammunition, uniforms, and fortifications contribute to GDP, they do not improve long-term welfare or capital formation.38 Russia also faces one of the most severe demographic challenges among major economies, with a shrinking and aging population, low birth rate, high mortality rate (especially among working-age men), and high rate of emigration among skilled workers.
Με άλλα λόγια: έτσι και ο πόλεμος σταματήσει αύριο η Ρωσία θα έχει οικονομικό πρόβλημα.
(Βέβαια ο Τράμπ με την ηλίθια επίθεσή του στο Ιράν έδωσε μια χείρα βοηθείας στην καημένη τη Ρωσία
)
Αυτός είναι ένας άλλος λόγος που ο πόλεμος συνεχίζεται από την πλευρά της Ρωσίας: όχι μόνο δεν έχει επιτύχει τους ΑΝΣΚ της ("αποναζιστικοποίηση και αποστρατικοποίηση" της Ουκρανίας δηλ. μετατροπή της σε Λευκορωσία και "απελευθέρωση του Ντονμπας" ΟΚ αυτόν σχεδόν τον έχει επιτύχει) αλλά δεν την συμφέρει οικονομικά να τον σταματήσει.
Overall, Russia’s nominal GDP is closer to Canada or Italy—not the United States, China, or even Germany or Japan. Even adjusted for purchasing power parity, Russia remains far smaller than top-tier economic powers like the United States or China; it has a GDP five and a half times smaller than the United States and four times smaller than China
Σημείωση: άλλα links
σχετικά με το ΑΕΠ και σχετικά με το
ΑΕΠ ΡΡΡ μπορεί να τα δει κανείς. Οπου φαίνεται ότι η Ρωσία είναι #9 σε ΑΕΠ λίγο πίσω από Ιταλία-Γαλλία και λίγο πάνω από Βραζιλία-Καναδά και #4 σε ΑΕΠ ΡΡΡ (πολύ) πίσω από την Ινδία και πάνω από την Ιαπωνία και τη Γερμανία.
Σε όρους
ΑΕΠ ΡΡΡ κατά κεφαλή είναι #43 λίγο πίσω από την Πορτογαλία και πάνω από την Εσθονία και τη Ρουμανία (Ελλάδα στο #49 BTW). Δεν το λες και σπουδαίο επίτευγμα για 25+ χρόνια διακυβέρνησης Πούτιν της μεγαλύτερης και πλουσιότερης σε φυσικούς πόρους κάθε είδους χώρας του κόσμου.
These challenges have second- and third-order effects on economic productivity and innovation. One example is AI. As President Putin once predicted, “Artificial intelligence is the future not only of Russia but of all of mankind. . . . Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” But Russia today is a bottom-tier AI power. It ranks 28 of 36 countries in the overall strength and development of its AI ecosystem—or AI “vibrancy”—according to Stanford University. The top-performing Russian AI model trails even older iterations of OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Google’s Gemini.
Even worse, Russia had zero companies in the top 100 technology companies in the world by market capitalization—the total market value of a company traded on the stock market
Αν κάποιος πει ότι η Ρωσία είναι "εκτός" του παγκόσμιου συστήματος και άρα μπορεί να μην είναι "ορατή" η όποιοα πρόοδός της στον τομέα του ΑΙ και ότι τα σχετικά με την κεφαλαιοποίηση σίγουρα είναι εκτός θέματος, καθώς οι Ρωσικές εταιρείες είναι εκτός των παγκόσμιων χρηματιστηρίων, θα έχει δίκιο. Βέβαια αυτά είναι στρατηγική επιλογή της λόγω της στάσης της στο Ουκρανικό ήδη από το 2014. Και υπενθυμίζω ότι η Κίνα, #1 αντίπαλος των ΗΠΑ για "παγκόσμια κυριαρχία" είναι επίσης #1 ή #2 στο ΑΙ και πολύ υψηλά στην κεφαλαιοποίηση. Αυτά είναι για τις επόμενες γενεές των Ρώσων.
Russia’s space industry, which was once a global leader, has fallen to historically low levels. Roscosmos, the state corporation in charge of the Russian space program, carried out only 17 orbital launches in 2025, compared to 193 orbital launches by the United States (led by SpaceX) and 92 by China.
...
Russia’s last successful robotic planetary science mission was four decades ago, while the United States, China, Europe, and some others continue to conduct them. During its most recent attempt in 2023, the Luna-25 spacecraft crashed into the Moon as it prepared for landing
Ποιός θα το ΄λεγε...
To help prevent a further deterioration of Russia’s economy and defense industrial base, Russia has leaned heavily on China. China-Russia trade reached nearly $250 billion in 2024, up from $190 billion in 2022.46 China has been Russia’s top trading partner since 2014, with its share of Russia’s foreign trade increasing from 11.3 percent in 2014 to 33.8 percent in 2024.47 In addition, Russia relies on oil exports to China, which now make up about 75 percent of China’s imports, compared to a pre-2022 average of between 60 and 65 percent
Με άλλα λόγια, από παγκόσμια υπερδύναμη προ 40 ετών σε γιουσουφάκι της Κίνας
(Και αυτό απαντάει σε όσους λένε ότι οι Κινέζοι θα ασχοληθούν με το Ιράν επειδή δεν θα έχουν πετρέλαιο κτλ. Χέστηκαν οι Κινέζοι για το Ιράν, έχουν όλο το πετρέλαιο που θέλουν δίπλα τους σε καλές τιμές)
While Russia still possesses nuclear weapons and a large military, it does not measure up as a great power in virtually any category of military, economic, or science and technology indicators
Russia has suffered the highest casualty rate of any major power in any war since World War II, and its military has performed poorly, with historically slow rates of advance and little new territory to show for its efforts over the last two years.
Βέβαια...
In addition, President Putin and the Russian government have been adept in conducting an aggressive disinformation campaign that has convinced some policymakers, including in Washington, that Russian victory is inevitable, despite substantial evidence to the contrary. Russia boosted its funding for state-run media in 2026 by roughly 54 percent, indicating a commitment to intensified information warfare. The Kremlin’s propaganda machine is designed to sustain domestic support for the regime and its war against Ukraine, as well as to convince key foreign audiences that the war has been successful and needs to continue.
Και καλά κάνει εννοείται, οποιοσδήποτε στη θέση του αυτό θα έκανε.
, πόσο δε μάλλον να σε προβοκάρω κιόλας 
