Για θέματα γενικού ενδιαφέροντος, εκτός μηχανοκίνητων...
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By dimitrisB
#753964 Υπενθυμίζω:
dimitrisB έγραψε:Aν ξέρατε ποιοί είναι κάποιοι (όχι όλοι) εκ των "στρατιωτικών αναλυτών" που προέρχονται απ τις ένοπλες δυνάμεις και τι "πουλάνε", ακόμα και για το βαθμό που φέρουν έστω και ε.α. θα καταλαβαίνετε γενικότερα ποιοί κυκλοφορούν στα κάθε είδους τηλεοπτικά παράθυρα .
Ωχ-ωχ και ουφφφφφφφφφφφ ! :(

Κατά τα λοιπά : Αποφεύγω τα σχόλια για το όλο θέμα, αφού προσωπικά, σαν ένα απλό φανταράκι υπηρέτησα, οπότε ... :s_dunno
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By glf
#753995 Έρχονται οι ενισχύσεις. Ή τους τελειώνουν τα φορτηγά ή βρήκαν τον τρόπο να καταναλώσουν τα αντιαρματικά αποθέματα της Ουκρανίας.

https://mobile.twitter.com/L_Team10/sta ... 2084410378
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By theo13
#754028
glf έγραψε:Έρχονται οι ενισχύσεις. Ή τους τελειώνουν τα φορτηγά ή βρήκαν τον τρόπο να καταναλώσουν τα αντιαρματικά αποθέματα της Ουκρανίας.

https://mobile.twitter.com/L_Team10/sta ... 2084410378


Ή θα τα χρησιμοποιήσουν για τους ανθρωπιστικούς διαδρόμους εκκένωσης (λεωφορεία βανάκια) και μεταφοράς αγαθών (φορτηγάκια, ψυγεία) και την υποστήριξη αυτών (βυτιοφόρα); :hmmm:
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By Serf
#754041
glf έγραψε:Έρχονται οι ενισχύσεις. Ή τους τελειώνουν τα φορτηγά ή βρήκαν τον τρόπο να καταναλώσουν τα αντιαρματικά αποθέματα της Ουκρανίας.

https://mobile.twitter.com/L_Team10/sta ... 2084410378


Τα οποία αντιαρματικά παίζει να είναι από τα λίγα σε αφθονία δεδομένων των συνεχών δωρεών από δυτικά κράτη.
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By Serf
#754049 Ισχύει ότι Ουκρανικά αεροσκάφη επιχειρούν από γειτονικές της Ουκρανίας χώρες (Πολωνία???); Δηλαδή απογειώνοναι εκεί, επιχειρούν στην Ουκρανία κι επιστρέφουν εκτός Ουκρανίας για ασφαλή στάθμευση;

https://www.news247.gr/kosmos/polemos-s ... 53399.html
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By rx8_drifter
#754053 Νομίζω από τα πιο σοκαριστικά πράγματα σε έναν πόλεμο ειναι το πως τον βιώνουν τα παιδιά. Κοινοτυπία θα μου πεις, αλλά μίλαγα με τα κοριτσάκια της κολλητής μου στη Σουηδία.
Η μεγάλη πάει 1η Δημοτικού και η μικρή νηπιαγωγίο, 6 και 4 χρονών. Στην τάξη της μεγάλης, επειδη κάποιο παιδάκι ρώταγε για τον πόλεμο, τους έκαναν συζήτηση.
Απο τότε η μεγάλη εχει πάθει εμμονή, ρωτάει κάθε μέρα πότε θα τελειώσει και αν σκοτώνονται παιδάκια. Η μικρή όταν της ειπε η μεγάλη τί γίνεται, έβαλε τα κλάμματα και της ειπε να μην της ξαναπεί γι αυτο :(
Εμενα η μεγάλη στο τηλέφωνο με ρώταγε ποιος ειναι ο κακός και αν ο Πούτιν που είναι ο κακός γιατί δεν ειναι φυλακή

Χτες, για την καθαρά Δευτέρα, έφτιαξε αυτό τον αετό:

Εικόνα

Εικόνα

6 χρονών ψυχούλα :s_sad
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By mirage
#754054
Serf έγραψε:Ισχύει ότι Ουκρανικά αεροσκάφη επιχειρούν από γειτονικές της Ουκρανίας χώρες (Πολωνία???); Δηλαδή απογειώνοναι εκεί, επιχειρούν στην Ουκρανία κι επιστρέφουν εκτός Ουκρανίας για ασφαλή στάθμευση;

https://www.news247.gr/kosmos/polemos-s ... 53399.html
Ποια αεροσκάφη; Εκει καπου την πρώτη δεύτερη μέρα δεν είχαν δηλώσει οι Ρώσοι πως τα κατέστρεψαν ολα, μαζί με την αεράμυνα, και πλέον ειχαν απόλυτο έλεγχο των αιθέρων πάνω από την Ουκρανία; Σήμερα βεβαια έχασαν κι άλλο ένα on camera απο MANPAD.
https://twitter.com/Caucasuswar/status/ ... -luBw&s=19
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By Hellenic tifosi
#754058
Serf έγραψε:Ισχύει ότι Ουκρανικά αεροσκάφη επιχειρούν από γειτονικές της Ουκρανίας χώρες (Πολωνία???); Δηλαδή απογειώνοναι εκεί, επιχειρούν στην Ουκρανία κι επιστρέφουν εκτός Ουκρανίας για ασφαλή στάθμευση;

https://www.news247.gr/kosmos/polemos-s ... 53399.html


Δε νομίζω ότι παίζει αυτό, θα ήταν αφορμή για ευθεία σύγκρουση Ρωσίας-ΝΑΤΟ. Πιθανότατα η ανακοίνωση προσπαθεί να προκαταλαβει την κατάσταση.
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By rx8_drifter
#754059 https://twitter.com/Alfi234/status/1500 ... DJnhVTGfGQ

Ξεφόρτωμα, το :lipsealed:

Εγω ειλικρινά δε μπορω να καταλάβω την στάση της Δύσης. Όλα τα thinktank τους έλεγαν οτι αν συνεχιστεί ο προσεταιρισμός της Ουκρανίας κατ αυτόν τον τρόπο, θα εχεις πολεμική σύρραξη. Όλοι έλεγαν οτι αυτο επρεπε να αποφευχθεί. Και αυτοί όχι μόνο πουλήσαν παραμύθι, όχι μόνο αφήσαν εναν ολόκληρο λαό να τον σφάξουν σαν αρνί το Πάσχα, τώρα λένε και τον αρχηγό τους puppet

https://mobile.twitter.com/rnaudbertran ... 7902062592

Ευτυχώς ανήκομεν στη Δύση :s_hang
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By Y.V
#754062 Τι δεν μπορεις να καταλαβεις;
Πολλα ειναι τα σεναρια...Που να ξερουμε τι ισχυει είτε απο δω, ειτε απο κει;
Πχ: Ενα που μου ρχεται γρηγορα ειναι οτι βρηκαν τροπο να κανουν πολλη μεγαλη ζημια στην Ρωσσια χωρις να την πολεμησουν καν και να φταιει αυτη κι ολας. (Δεν ειμαι βεβαιος αν ηταν η Ρωσσια γενικα ή κυριως ο Πουτιν και δευτερευοντως η Ρωσσια)
Αλλα μπα! Δεν τους ειχα τοσο βλακες τους Ρωσσους να πεσουν σε τετοια παγιδα. :s_dunno
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By Serf
#754064
EXPLAINER ON RUSSIAN CONSCRIPTION, RESERVE, AND MOBILIZATION

Kateryna Stepanenko, Frederick W. Kagan, Brian Babcock-Lumish
March 5, 2022

The early announcement of the 2022 spring draft is unlikely to increase Russian combat power in Ukraine in the near term.
Recent Russian efforts to create a Western-style reserve force are unlikely to materially impact combat operations in Ukraine.
As Russia exhausts its high-readiness units staffed with contract soldiers, the quality of reinforcements is likely to be much lower than the units first committed to the invasion.
The Russian military is a hybrid format combining a traditional cadre-and-reserve conscript system and a contract-professional system. While the Russian Army has made efforts to professionalize its ranks, particularly in the last 15 years, it remains reliant on conscripts, both for its active-duty force and for its reserve forces in the event of general mobilization.[1] Most combat units must be filled out by conscripts or mobilized reservists in order to be combat-capable. Contract soldiers are concentrated in the cadre and elite units, especially the airborne units.

The cadre-and-reserve units of the Russian Armed Forces are maintained at a low readiness with a limited number of professional staff and conscripts, with the expectation that they would be staffed with reservists in the event of mobilization.[2] The Russians have already used many cadre-and-reserve units in Ukraine, and they have not performed well against the Ukrainians, with some units suffering heavy losses. Russia does not likely have a large reserve of highly skilled contract units remaining, although there are probably some uncommitted forces.

Conscription

The Russian Armed Forces conscript men semi-annually, with the fall draft lasting from October 1 until December 31 and the spring draft running from April 1 until July 15.[3] In 2022, the Kremlin announced the spring draft early on February 18.[4] The draft affects all men aged 18 to 27 years old, though some conscripts can be as young as 16 years old.[5] Russian conscripts typically serve one year.[6] The annual conscription pool of all Russian military-aged men is approximately 1.2 million people, though only about half are compelled to present themselves at their local military commissariat (voenkomat). The Russian General Staff reported conscripting 127,000 people for the fall 2021 draft and 134,000 people in spring 2021 out of 672,000 summoned men.[7] The number of conscripts is relatively consistent year on year, with 263,000 in 2020 and 267,000 in 2019.[8] Approximately 261,000 conscripts from 2021 are currently serving across Russian units, with the fall 2021 conscripts entering their third month of training.

New conscripts undergo a one- to two-month basic training, followed by three-to-six months of advanced training before arriving at their assigned units.[9] Current law precludes conscripts from deploying to combat with less than four months of training; however, martial law or general mobilization could supersede the current policy, allowing for the immediate employment of new conscripts or mobilized reservists.[10] Some of the fall 2021 conscripts are likely already serving in units fighting in Ukraine. The rapid employment of relatively untrained reservists is unlikely to materially increase Russia’s combat power in Ukraine.

Russian Reserve

The Russian reserve has over two million former conscripts and contract servicemen on paper, but few are actively trained or prepared for war.[11] Historically, only 10 percent of reservists receive refresher training after completing their initial term of service.[12] Russia lacks the administrative and financial capacity to train reservists on an ongoing basis. According to a 2019 RAND analysis, Russia only had 4,000 to 5,000 troops in what would be considered an active reserve in the Western sense, meaning soldiers attending regular monthly and annual training.[13] Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu has repeatedly stated that the Russian Armed Forces hoped to have 80,000-100,000 active reserve members.[14]

In 2021, the Russian military started a new initiative to remedy its lack of a ready reserve, the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS-2021). BARS-2021 aimed to establish an active reserve by recruiting volunteer reservists for three-year contract service.[15] BARS-2021 operated on the same principle as US and NATO reserves, where reservists actively train and are compensated. The concept of BARS-2021 was that volunteer Russian reservists would regularly participate in monthly exercises and maintain their mobilization readiness while maintaining their civilian jobs.[16]

Local administrations began distributing information about enlisting into the Russian reserves throughout late August and early September 2021, offering significant financial incentives.[17] Eligible reservists included soldiers younger than 42, junior officers younger than 47, colonels younger than 57, and other senior officials younger than 52.[18] Reservists would continue training two or three times a month throughout peacetime and form their own military units. The Southern Military District (SMD) announced a goal of having a 38,000-person reserve corps of service veterans, up from 400 people.[19] There is limited information on how many reservists returned to military service; Novokuznetsk data shows that the city planned to gain 220 reservists, but reported only recruiting 20.[20] The Central Military District (CMD) reported conducting a BARS-2022 program from January 24-26, 2022, during which the CMD gained 9,000 reservists.

The Russian Armed Forces sought to create exclusively reservist units but likely did not accomplish its goals due to low engagement.[21] The Russian Defense Ministry hoped to recruit more than 100,000 reservists starting in August 2021, but it is unlikely the Kremlin was able to achieve its goals on such a short timeline.

Mobilization

Current law limits mobilization of reserves to soldiers and sailors younger than 45 and officers younger than 55. Men who transferred to the reserve less than two years ago, fathers of three or more children, and those with criminal records are also exempt from mobilization under current law.[22] The Russian State Duma adopted a bill on February 22 to strengthen general mobilization, making it mandatory for men to appear at a military commissar’s office without receiving a conscription notice from regional authorities.[23] This law will reduce the administrative time needed to enlist conscripts if the Kremlin announces martial law. Russian independent media source Vazhnye Istorii explained that the Russian military can activate both reservists and new conscripts during general mobilization, including those previously exempted from conscription.[24] In the event of a general mobilization, the Russian Army will likely attempt to fill the ranks of nascent reserve units and backfill combat casualties from units already serving in Ukraine.

The Russian cadre-and-reserve units concentrated around Ukraine before the invasion almost certainly required a significant reserve call-up to fill out. As the ground offensive in Ukraine stalls, the Russian military likely faces a requirement for a new reserve call up to fill out additional units and replace individual losses in these units. There is reporting as of March 5 that 3,000 individual replacements are being mobilized across the Russian border from Kharkiv to replace combat losses in Russian units.[25]

As early as December 2021, the Russian Committee for Soldier’s Mothers claimed that newly signed reservists and contractors started deploying to units near the Ukrainian border.[26] The Committee claimed that the new reservists arrived in Belgorod Oblast to the following units: Training Military unit in Kovrov (unit number 306616), 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (Valuyki), 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (Boguchar, Valuyki), 4th Guards Tank Division, and 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division.[27] US officials also note that Russian reservists will be integrated across all 120-125 battalion tactical groups following the initial invasion.[28]

Conclusion

Russia is likely rapidly exhausting the manpower it can readily use to generate additional effective combat power even as its forces lose combat effectiveness in Ukraine amid high losses. Russian efforts to mobilize more manpower can bring more people into Russian combat units, but those people are unlikely to be well-enough trained or motivated to generate large amounts of new combat power.

Mobilization efforts are likely to start producing diminishing returns as Russia moves through the categories of fully-trained and recently-released reservists into categories of people further removed from their initial military experiences and/or those who will undergo hasty training before deployment to the front lines. Individual replacements for battlefield losses are unlikely to have the same training as their predecessors, and new units or those reinforced by these augmentees will not have undergone unit-level training prior to employment. More units and reservist replacements will likely appear in Ukraine, therefore, but the net effect on Russia’s actual combat capability will likely be small and diminishing.

A declaration of martial law and general mobilization would not overcome the structural challenges of Russia’s hybrid cadre-and-reserves and contract-soldier system. Creating cohesive fighting units cannot be accomplished overnight. Replacing individual combat casualties in Ukraine with recalled reservists who have gone years without military training is unlikely to dramatically increase Russian combat power.
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By Serf
#754067 Η ερώτηση του αδαούς: ποια μαχητικά θα εγγυηθούν την ασφάλεια των A-10;

Transfer three A-10 aircraft squadrons to Ukraine now
By Everett Pyatt
Thursday, Mar 3

America should provide Ukraine with the A-10 Warthog, argues Everett Pyatt, a former assistant secretary of the U.S. Navy for shipbuilding and logistics. (Tech. Sgt. Gregory Brook/U.S. Air Force)
“Give us the tools, and we will finish the job,“ spoke U.K. Prime Minister Winston Churchill in February 1941. Following this powerful speech, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt proposed and Congress approved the lend-lease program. This provided the U.K. equipment and access to United States production capacity. This action was essential to stopping the Nazi advances.

History often rhymes. Now, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is making the same plea for equipment necessary to stop the advance of the Russian autocratic Army. Now is the time for another lend-lease program supporting Ukraine.

Congress is acting in a supportive manner, but details are important. Russia must face a military defeat to enforce sanctions. The history of sanctions supports the conclusion that they do not change policy, but rather make conduct of business far more difficult while imposing distress on the economy as shown in Iraq, Iran, North Korea and others.

Sanctions must be accompanied by military success.

Zelenskyy has requested weapons and support in line with Churchill’s philosophy. Ukrainian soldiers have proved their courage and bravery. There is one more step that could be decisive: the transfer of three squadrons of A-10 aircraft to the Ukrainian Air Force.

This aircraft and its gun system were designed to counter an armored assault in Europe. They proved effective in Desert Storm’s target-rich environment, quite similar to the current advancing Russian force. They also became the infantry’s friend in close-air support missions.

The United States Air Force has deployment packages ready to go. The whole transfer to the Ukrainian Air Force could be completed in days after congressional authorization.

Firepower is needed to defeat the coming onslaught of armored forces. Other weapons are necessary for ground forces, but air power will be decisive. The A-10 has proven this ability and was designed for this purpose.

Zelenskyy asked NATO for air support. This request was declined by NATO. That is an appropriate decision since Russia has not attacked NATO.

However, that decision leaves each country an opportunity to decide based on its own moral compass. Many, including the United States, have decided to provide and have already supplied lethal aid necessary to slow the Russian advance. Some effects are notable, but military analysts agree that the long-term outlook for Ukraine’s survival is not good. One predicts a continuing resistance war for decades.

Zelenskyy is right in requesting air power support. It is necessary to slow or stop the oncoming juggernaut of Russian armored forces. The United States has the most effective weapon for this role — the U.S. Air Force’s A-10 aircraft. It is available since the service wants to retire most of the 30-year-old fleet. The airplane was designed to operate in Europe from ill-prepared facilities. Pilot retraining is minimal. All that is needed is painting Ukrainian insignia and delivering the aircraft. This could be done in days.

Each day is critical to slowing the momentum of Russia’s invading force. It is time to implement the United States’ moral compass and add the A-10 to the list of weapons already scheduled. Failure to add defensive capability to current Ukraine forces, while sanctions develop, weakens the potential impact of sanctions. They are complementary actions.

Everett Pyatt is a former assistant secretary of the U.S. Navy for shipbuilding and logistics.