IKE έγραψε:Η τρόικα κάνει προτάσεις για να αναστραφεί αυτό που βλέπεις στο διάγραμμα, οι ελληνικές κυβερνήσεις κάνουν ακριβώς το ανάποδο, ποιοι είναι τα γίδια λοιπόν?
Βλέπεις ένα νουμεράκι που γράφει 2010. Τραβάς μία γραμμούλα ίιιιιιιιιιιιιιισα πάνω και βρίσκεις που τέμνει τη μπλε σκούρα γραμμη. Εκεί είναι που άρχισε να κάνει προτάσεις η τρόικα. Ακόμα και εσύ μπορείς να δεις το αποτέλεσμα. Και ίσως γυρίσεις και πλευρό.
KiloMeater έγραψε:Δεν έχει σημασία πόσες και ποιες προτάσεις έγιναν, αλλά τί υλοποιήθηκε.
KiloMeater έγραψε:Δεν έχει σημασία πόσες και ποιες προτάσεις έγιναν, αλλά τί υλοποιήθηκε.
“Hither came Conan, the Cimmerian, black-haired, sullen-eyed, sword in hand, a thief, a reaver, a slayer, with gigantic melancholies and gigantic mirth, to tread the jeweled thrones of the Earth under his sandaled feet.”
“Hither came Conan, the Cimmerian, black-haired, sullen-eyed, sword in hand, a thief, a reaver, a slayer, with gigantic melancholies and gigantic mirth, to tread the jeweled thrones of the Earth under his sandaled feet.”
gto250swb έγραψε:Δλδ νταξ ας πουμε οτι ο συριζα φταιει για ολα, οι ευρωπαιοι τοσο γιδια που δεν καταλαβαινουν οιτ αυτο το διαγραμμα σημαινει βομβα μεγατονων που με ή χωρις συριζα καποτε θα σκασει?
Η απάντηση:
IKE έγραψε:Η τρόικα κάνει προτάσεις για να αναστραφεί αυτό που βλέπεις στο διάγραμμα, οι ελληνικές κυβερνήσεις κάνουν ακριβώς το ανάποδο, ποιοι είναι τα γίδια λοιπόν?
Αν δεν σου κάνει περιμένουμε μία καλύτερη.
τα λέω χύμα και τσουβαλάτα, αν παρεξηγηθεί κανείς, ξυδάκι!! (όχι εντάξει, πλάκα κάνω, όλοι φιλαράκια είμαστε βρε παιδιά!)
- 28 Ιουν 2015, 00:14#129790
Kατάλαβε κανείς γιατί έκανε το σόου ο Σαμαράς και τα κοπρόσκυλά του;
“Hither came Conan, the Cimmerian, black-haired, sullen-eyed, sword in hand, a thief, a reaver, a slayer, with gigantic melancholies and gigantic mirth, to tread the jeweled thrones of the Earth under his sandaled feet.”
In May 2010, Greece accepted a first bail-out promising € 107 billion, primarily in loan refinancing. There were four major mistakes with this bailout:
It fully compensated private sector holders of Greek government bonds (mainly French and German banks) at a time when these bonds were discounted by 20-30%. There was no debt haircut on private bondholders at the outset, which is standard in most cases. This was basically a financial rescue package for the European banking system. The weighted average interest rate was about 4.5%, meaning that over the five years of the programme, the cost of interest would equal the cost of austerity and privatisation. The cost of interest wasn’t properly calculated. In 2011, for instance, total interest paid was € 16.34 billion, versus € 6.6 billon as calculated in the bail-out. This is an elementary error that any first year finance student would have presumably corrected: Calculate 4.5% of € 300 billion. The programme envisioned that by 2014, Greece would have a deficit of 2.55% and a public debt of € 359 billion, yet return to the markets for financing. This is difficult to believe, given at the outset of the crisis Greek public debt was at least € 290 billion and Greece was already cut off from the markets. There was no overall list of priorities for structure reform.
Please view Table 7 of the European Commission’s Staff Working Paper for details: I reproduce the relevant table below: Notice that I don’t even touch the IMF multiplier debate: there are so many errors in the first four points above that I really don’t need to.
The Second Greek Bail-out
The first Bail-out was followed by a second Bail-out, in which the keynote feature was a Private Sector Involvement (PSI). PSI saw private bondholders with a nominal value of € 100 billion have their bonds written down by about 75%. But this too was wrongly calculated:
A € 20 billion “sweetener” was added to induce bondholders to participate;
The Greek banking system had to be recapitalised with € 50 billion via the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund;
The Greek social security system, which held at least € 20 billion of Greek government bonds, was not recapitalised, leading to massive financial losses.
So the actual net benefit of PSI was, at best, € 30 billion (out of a nominal € 100 billion), and if one counts the losses to the social security system, it is actually lower. These social security system losses had to be reimbursed by the Greek government in subsequent years.
The Last Instalment of the Second Bailout
This brings us to the present package, which in fact is simply revised conditionality for the last instalment of the second bail out. My comments are the following:
The first two bail-out packages have been monumentally botched. These have been exclusively errors made by the Troika of lenders, who have set the terms for each of these. Successive Greek governments have not helped matters, in that they have been more intent on safeguarding public sector sinecures and related oligarchs rather than implementing true structural reform or a pro-growth agenda that respects European law (or even common sense). Although a significant fiscal adjustment has been achieved and public sector employment has fallen by 30% (mainly through early retirement and non-renewal of temporary contracts), structural reforms have been few and of limited impact. Greece has been financially self-sufficient since August 2014, and in this time has successfully repaid or rolled over its debt load. The argument over new conditionality for the last instalment is therefore entirely misplaced, particularly since 100% of this instalment is going to repay the IMF and ECB. None of it goes to sustain the Greek public sector. I believe this is sufficient good faith in the process—particularly given the Troika’s monumental mistakes in the past—to warrant an immediate release of the final tranche, directly to creditors if need be. All this fuss is about creditors paying € 7.2 billion to repay creditors, and is simply not serious. SYRIZA has done itself no favours given its chaotic negotiating style, its statist demagoguery and its blatant disregard of economic and financial reality. However, in some aspects it is correct: a debt restructuring is needed, and its proposals in this direction bear some serious consideration, which was unfortunately never afforded to it by the Troika. Misperceptions among national and international press and deliberate politicking are creating problems where no problems should exist. Greece’s debt is manageable, providing the short-term distortions of the previous two bail-outs can be managed, and proving Greece finally implements a pro-growth agenda. The large majority of bail-out funds disbursed to date have been to refinance existing debt. The distortions in the bail-out packages have been exclusively the fault of Greece’s official creditors.
Το ΔΝΤ έχει μια πολύ συγκεκριμένη συνταγή. Πες την και άκαρδη (γιατί όντως είναι, σου λέει tough luck αν δεν υπάρχουν νοσοκομεία κλπ), αλλά τουλάχιστον έχει μια λογική βάση: η χώρα που έχει πρόβλημα πρέπει να κάνει διαρθρωτικές αλλαγές για να κόψει το έλλειμα (γιατί αν συνεχίζεις να "χάνεις" λεφτά, θα κάνεις μια τρύπα στο νερό ακόμα και αν σου χαρίσουν τα χρέη) αλλά ταυτόχρονα γίνεται και γενναία διαγραφή χρεών.
Εμείς κόψαμε το έλλειμα όπως μας ζητήθηκε (με λάθος μέθοδο, θα αναφερθώ έπειτα σε αυτό), αλλά όσον αφορά τη πραγματική διαγραφή του χρέους: αναβολή στην αναβολή. Έχω γράψει σε προηγούμενο ποστ το ιστορικό. Ακόμα και τη περασμένη βδομάδα έγινε το ίδιο ακριβώς. Υπογράψτε αυτό, take it or leave it, there's no alternative κλπ, και για την ελάφρυνση του χρέους; "Θα δούμε".
Όλες οι ελληνικές κυβερνήσεις (και του Συριζα), έκαναν τα πράγματα ακόμα χειρότερα για να προστατέψουν τη πελατεία τους και τους ολιγάρχες. Όμως δεν οφείλεται όλο το πρόβλημα σε αυτό.
Ούτε οι ΝΔΠΑΣΟΚ μας έσωσαν, ούτε ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ θα μας σώσει, ούτε ο Σόιμπλε.-
Τελευταία επεξεργασία από Zorz και 28 Ιουν 2015, 00:20, έχει επεξεργασθεί 1 φορά/ες συνολικά
