IMF tells eurozone to start Greek debt talks
However, let there be no doubt that meeting this higher target would not only be very difficult to reach, but possibly counterproductive. Greece’s fiscal adjustment has in the past fallen short of what was needed because of the lack of structural reforms underlying the adjustment effort. We do not believe that it will be possible to reach a 3.5 percent of GDP primary surplus by relying on hiking already high taxes levied on a narrow base, cutting excessively discretionary spending, and counting on one-off measures as has been proposed in recent weeks. The additional adjustment effort of 2 percent of GDP would only be credible if based on long overdue public sector reforms, notably of the pension and tax systems.
Unfortunately, the contingency mechanism that Greece is proposing does not include such reforms. Instead, the authorities have offered to make short-term across-the-board cuts in discretionary spending — which has already been compressed to the point where the provision of public services is severely compromised — or transitory cuts in pension and wages not supported by fundamental parametric reforms. Based on past performance, such ad-hoc measures are not very credible, but they are also undesirable as they add to uncertainty and fail to resolve the underlying imbalances. I should also add that Greece has legislated a dozen contingency-type mechanisms in the past that have largely not worked.
Μια ματιά στα υπογραμμισμένα (άνευ γαβριλίστικης ερμηνείας/μετάφρασης) για να μην διαβάζουμε βλακείες μέσα στις επόμενες εβδομάδες που αναμένεται το sequel του "Διαπραγμάτευση 17 ώρες. Η επιστροφή".
Ελπίζω (...) ότι ο Τσίπρας θα δεχτεί τελικά τα συγκεκριμένα ανάλγητα μέτρα (αντί για τα χαράτσια και τις αυξήσεις στις εισφορές που θέλει) με αντάλλαγμα το τυράκι της τελικής αναδιάρθρωσης του χρέους το οποίο φυσικά (και εύλογα) θα μοστράρει ως χρυσόμαλλο δέρας.


