- 12 Ιούλ 2019, 17:18
#594568
QsisVTS έγραψε:224v έγραψε:Με τους κωδικούς της εφορίας μπάινεις ψηφίζεις και τέλος. Απλά τους έξω δεν τους παραμυθιαζουν οι πολιτικοί μας εύκολα και έτσι δεν θέλουν το ποσοστό τους να αλλάζει τις ισορροπίες που έχουν στο μυαλό τους.
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γενικά είμαι υπέρ της χρήσης της τεχνολογίας για τέτοιες διαδικασίες, πχ για πιο συχνά δημοψηφίσματα
βέβαια θα μπορούσαν να υπάρξουν προβλήματα αν δεν μιλάμε να πηγαίνει κάποιος αυτοπροσώπως σε ένα ελεγχόμενο μέρος να ψηφίσει 
αλλά η τεχνολογία θα βόλευε και κυρίως θα κόστιζε και πολύ λιγότερο
τώρα στο 2ο κομμάτι σου διαφωνώ, μπορεί να μην τρώνε απευθείας το σανό αλλά πολλές φορές δεν έχουν καθαρή εικόνα του τι συμβαίνει εδώ , βέβαια αυτό δεν ισχύει για άτομα που έχουν φύγει μέσα στη 10ετια της κρίσης , προφανώς, αλλά σε άτομα που λείπουν αρκετά χρόνια
Τα σκέφτεστε αυτά που λέτε;
1) Γίνεται εύκολα νοθεία, είτε λόγω λάθους του συστήματος ή ηθελημένα. Εδώ έναν Driver of the Day προσπάθησαν να βγάλουν ηλεκτρονικά κι έβγαλαν τον Κούμπιτσα, λόγω λάθους του συστήματος.
Φαντάζεστε να έβγαινε κατά λάθος κανένας Μιχαλολιάκος ή Τζήμερος;
(
https://wtf1.com/post/kubica-won-driver ... y-mistake/)
2) Με κωδικούς Taxis λέει... και το Κράτος να ξέρει χαρτί και καλαμάρι τι ψηφίζεις.
Για να μην μιλήσουμε για την Αντισυνταγματικότητα αυτού, καθώς η ψήφος είναι μυστική!!!
3) Πως γίνεται επανακαταμέτρηση; Σήμερα ανοίγεις τους σάκους και ξαναμετράς. Ηλεκτρονικά πως ξαναμετράς;
4) Αξιοπιστία. Γίνεται ένα black-out ή πέφτει ένας server και ακυρώνονται όλες οι εκλογές.
5) Ασφάλεια. Πως διασφαλίζεις ότι δεν θα χακαριστεί το σύστημα, είτε τοπικά ή στα κεντρικά.
6) Ακόμα και οι άνθρωποι που εξέλισσαν τέτοια συστήματα, λένε ότι δεν γίνεται και ότι είναι λάθος:
Despite spending years developing GNU.FREE, a free online voting system, Jason Kitcat – leader of Brighton and Hove City Council – isn’t a fan of e-voting (nor is his party).
“Through working on this I came to the conclusion, now shared by most computer scientists, that e-voting cannot be delivered securely and reliably with current technology. So I stopped developing the system but continued to campaign on and research the issues,” he said.
That includes observing e-voting and e-counting systems used in the UK and Estonia. His reports don’t make for encouraging reading.
“When I and colleagues have monitored trials we have always observed serious flaws in the security and reliability of the systems used,” he said. “Yes, we have found problems every single time, and we have documented these at great length in peer-reviewed articles.”
Kitcat argued there are three requirements for robust political elections: security, anonymity and verifiability. “Meeting those three requirements is a very difficult problem quite unlike other transactions,” he said.
”Online banking suffers problems but refunds are possible after checking your bank statement. You can’t ‘refund’ a vote and ‘vote statements’ can’t be provided to check your vote was correctly recorded as that would enable vote selling and coercion.”
All that paper in standard ballots may seem old fashioned, but it leaves a trail that votes cast from PCs and phones don’t, agreed other experts. “There’s a fundamental conflict between verification and keeping votes anonymous,” Jim Killock, executive director of the Open Rights Group. “Paper ballots do this very neatly but computers find this hard because they leave audit trails.”
Voting away from polls raises the spectre of vote manipulation, explained Ross Anderson, a computer security professor at the University of Cambridge.
“When you move from voting in person to voting at home (whether by post, by phone or over the internet) it vastly expands the scope for vote buying and coercion, and we’ve seen this rising steadily in the UK since the 2001 election where postal votes first became a right,” he said. “All the parties have been caught hustling up the vote in various ways.”
That Harvard cyber law study into Swiss e-voting trials echoed that, noting that, aside from malware and related threats, e-voting systems need to be secured against vote manipulation.
“Since no signatures are used, there is the risk that the e-voter is not actually the person he or she claims to be,” the report noted, adding that “just like postal or ballot box voting, e-voting will probably never be completely safe from manipulation or unlawful observation.”
Pirate party founder: 'Online voting? Would you want 4chan to decide your government?'
And all of this is before considering malware and other cyber security issues – in other words, someone directly trying to hack a vote. Killock pointed out that you would “need to ensure that everyone’s device had not been tampered with” – a challenge that seems insurmountable.
“Internet voting is frankly scary,” he said. “When security experts looked at the Estonia election, they were shocked at how easy it was to defraud the system and steal votes ... We shouldn’t gamble with democracy.”
Lack of transparency is another major security issue – especially if the data collection, analysis and storage happens in IT systems that aren’t fully transparent or are difficult to understand.
“This can turn out to be a threat to the legitimacy of the ballot since most people are not technically skilled enough to be able to control whether the system is truly working flawlessly,” the Harvard Law report noted.
“As of now, ‘average’ citizens have always helped in the counting of votes. This has – in some way – added to a feeling of control and a sense of connection with the state among the people.”
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ ... not-secure
